Ensayo sobre el entendimiento humano
Chapter I: No Innate Speculative Principles
1. The way shown how we come by any knowledge, sufficient to prove it not innate. It is an established opinion amongst some men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles; some primary notions, koinai ennoiai, characters, as it were stamped upon the mind of man; which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be sufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falseness of this supposition, if I should only show (as I hope I shall in the following parts of this Discourse) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impressions; and may arrive at certainty, without any such original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will easily grant that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes from external objects: and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.
But because a man is not permitted without censure to follow his own thoughts in the search of truth, when they lead him ever so little out of the common road, I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.
2. General assent the great argument. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted than that there are certain principles, both speculative and practical, (for they speak of both), universally agreed upon by all mankind: which therefore, they argue, must needs be the constant impressions which the souls of men receive in their first beings, and which they bring into the world with them, as necessarily and really as they do any of their inherent faculties.
3. Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in, which I presume may be done.
4. "What is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," not universally assented to. But, which is worse, this argument of universal consent, which is made use of to prove innate principles, seems to me a demonstration that there are none such: because there are none to which all mankind give an universal assent. I shall begin with the speculative, and instance in those magnified principles of demonstration, "Whatsoever is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed title to innate. These have so settled a reputation of maxims universally received, that it will no doubt be thought strange if any one should seem to question it. But yet I take liberty to say, that these propositions are so far from having an universal assent, that there are a great part of mankind to whom they are not so much as known.
5. Not on the mind naturally imprinted, because not known to children, idiots, &c. For, first, it is evident, that all children and idiots have not the least apprehension or thought of them. And the want of that is enough to destroy that universal assent which must needs be the necessary concomitant of all innate truths: it seeming to me near a contradiction to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul, which it perceives or understands not: imprinting, if it signify anything, being nothing else but the making certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint anything on the mind without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore children and idiots have souls, have minds, with those impressions upon them, they must unavoidably perceive them, and necessarily know and assent to these truths; which since they do not, it is evident that there are no such impressions. For if they are not notions naturally imprinted, how can they be innate? and if they are notions imprinted, how can they be unknown? To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say, that the mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this impression nothing. No proposition can be said to be in the mind which it never yet knew, which it was never yet conscious of. For if any one may, then, by the same reason, all propositions that are true, and the mind is capable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in the mind, and to be imprinted: since, if any one can be said to be in the mind, which it never yet knew, it must be only because it is capable of knowing it; and so the mind is of all truths it ever shall know. Nay, thus truths may be imprinted on the mind which it never did, nor ever shall know; for a man may live long, and die at last in ignorance of many truths which his mind was capable of knowing, and that with certainty. So that if the capacity of knowing be the natural impression contended for, all the truths a man ever comes to know will, by this account, be every one of them innate; and this great point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which, whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny innate principles. For nobody, I think, ever denied that the mind was capable of knowing several truths. The capacity, they say, is innate; the knowledge acquired. But then to what end such contest for certain innate maxims? If truths can be imprinted on the understanding without being perceived, I can see no difference there can be between any truths the mind is capable of knowing in respect of their original: they must all be innate or all adventitious: in vain shall a man go about to distinguish them. He therefore that talks of innate notions in the understanding, cannot (if he intend thereby any distinct sort of truths) mean such truths to be in the understanding as it never perceived, and is yet wholly ignorant of. For if these words "to be in the understanding" have any propriety, they signify to be understood. So that to be in the understanding, and not to be understood; to be in the mind and never to be perceived, is all one as to say anything is and is not in the mind or understanding. If therefore these two propositions, "Whatsoever is, is," and "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," are by nature imprinted, children cannot be ignorant of them: infants, and all that have souls, must necessarily have them in their understandings, know the truth of them, and assent to it.
6. That men know them when they come to the use of reason, answered. To avoid this, it is usually answered, that all men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason; and this is enough to prove them innate. I answer:
7. Doubtful expressions, that have scarce any signification, go for clear reasons to those who, being prepossessed, take not the pains to examine even what they themselves say.For, to apply this answer with any tolerable sense to our present purpose, it must signify one of these two things: either that as soon as men come to the use of reason these supposed native inscriptions come to be known and observed by them; or else, that the use and exercise of men's reason, assists them in the discovery of these principles, and certainly makes them known to them.
8. If reason discovered them, that would not prove them innate. If they mean, that by the use of reason men may discover these principles, and that this is sufficient to prove them innate; their way of arguing will stand thus, viz. that whatever truths reason can certainly discover to us, and make us firmly assent to, those are all naturally imprinted on the mind; since that universal assent, which is made the mark of them, amounts to no more but this,- that by the use of reason we are capable to come to a certain knowledge of and assent to them; and, by this means, there will be no difference between the maxims of the mathematicians, and theorems they deduce from them: all must be equally allowed innate; they being all discoveries made by the use of reason, and truths that a rational creature may certainty come to know, if he apply his thoughts rightly that way.
9. It is false that reason discovers them. But how can these men think the use of reason necessary to discover principles that are supposed innate, when reason (if we may believe them) is nothing else but the faculty of deducing unknown truths from principles or propositions that are already known? That certainly can never be thought innate which we have need of reason to discover; unless, as I have said, we will have all the certain truths that reason ever teaches us, to be innate. We may as well think the use of reason necessary to make our eyes discover visible objects, as that there should be need of reason, or the exercise thereof, to make the understanding see what is originally engraven on it, and cannot be in the understanding before it be perceived by it. So that to make reason discover those truths thus imprinted, is to say, that the use of reason discovers to a man what he knew before: and if men have those innate impressed truths originally, and before the use of reason, and yet are always ignorant of them till they come to the use of reason, it is in effect to say, that men know and know them not at the same time.
10. No use made of reasoning in the discovery of these two maxims. It will here perhaps be said that mathematical demonstrations, and other truths that are not innate, are not assented to as soon as proposed, wherein they are distinguished from these maxims and other innate truths. I shall have occasion to speak of assent upon the first proposing, more particularly by and by. I shall here only, and that very readily, allow, that these maxims and mathematical demonstrations are in this different: that the one have need of reason, using of proofs, to make them out and to gain our assent; but the other, as soon as understood, are, without any the least reasoning, embraced and assented to. But I withal beg leave to observe, that it lays open the weakness of this subterfuge, which requires the use of reason for the discovery of these general truths: since it must be confessed that in their discovery there is no use made of reasoning at all. And I think those who give this answer will not be forward to affirm that the knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," is a deduction of our reason. For this would be to destroy that bounty of nature they seem so fond of, whilst they make the knowledge of those principles to depend on the labour of our thoughts. For all reasoning is search, and casting about, and requires pains and application. And how can it with any tolerable sense be supposed, that what was imprinted by nature, as the foundation and guide of our reason, should need the use of reason to discover it?
11. And if there were, this would prove them not innate. Those who will take the pains to reflect with a little attention on the operations of the understanding, will find that this ready assent of the mind to some truths, depends not, either on native inscription, or the use of reason, but on a faculty of the mind quite distinct from both of them, as we shall see hereafter. Reason, therefore, having nothing to do in procuring our assent to these maxims, if by saying, that "men know and assent to them, when they come to the use of reason," be meant, that the use of reason assists us in the knowledge of these maxims, it is utterly false; and were it true, would prove them not to be innate.
12. The coming to the use of reason not the time we come to know these maxims. If by knowing and assenting to them "when we come to the use of reason," be meant, that this is the time when they come to be taken notice of by the mind; and that as soon as children come to the use of reason, they come also to know and assent to these maxims; this also is false and frivolous. First, it is false; because it is evident these maxims are not in the mind so early as the use of reason; and therefore the coming to the use of reason is falsely assigned as the time of their discovery. How many instances of the use of reason may we observe in children, a long time before they have any knowledge of this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be?" And a great part of illiterate people and savages pass many years, even of their rational age, without ever thinking on this and the like general propositions. I grant, men come not to the knowledge of these general and more abstract truths, which are thought innate, till they come to the use of reason; and I add, nor then neither. Which is so, because, till after they come to the use of reason, those general abstract ideas are not framed in the mind, about which those general maxims are, which are mistaken for innate principles, but are indeed discoveries made and verities introduced and brought into the mind by the same way, and discovered by the same steps, as several other propositions, which nobody was ever so extravagant as to suppose innate. This I hope to make plain in the sequel of this Discourse. I allow therefore, a necessity that men should come to the use of reason before they get the knowledge of those general truths; but deny that men's coming to the use of reason is the time of their discovery.
13. By this they are not distinguished from other knowable truths. In the mean time it is observable, that this saying, that men know and assent to these maxims "when they come to the use of reason," amounts in reality of fact to no more but this,- that they are never known nor taken notice of before the use of reason, but may possibly be assented to some time after, during a man's life; but when is uncertain. And so may all other knowable truths, as well as these; which therefore have no advantage nor distinction from others by this note of being known when we come to the use of reason; nor are thereby proved to be innate, but quite the contrary.
14. If coming to the use of reason were the time of their discovery it would not prove them innate. But, secondly, were it true that the precise time of their being known and assented to were, when men come to the use of reason; neither would that prove them innate. This way of arguing is as frivolous as the supposition itself is false. For, by what kind of logic will it appear that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its first constitution, because it comes first to be observed and assented to when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a distinct province, begins to exert itself? And therefore the coming to the use of speech, if it were supposed the time that these maxims are first assented to, (which it may be with as much truth as the time when men come to the use of reason,) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to say they are innate because men assent to them when they come to the use of reason. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and self-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercise of reason: but I deny that the coming to the use of reason is the precise time when they are first taken notice of, and if that were the precise time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this proposition, that men "assent to them when they come to the use of reason," is no more but this,- that the making of general abstract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not those general ideas, nor learn the names that stand for them, till, having for a good while exercised their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary discourse and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational conversation. If assenting to these maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other sense, I desire it may be shown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate.
15. The steps by which the mind attains several truths. The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise its discursive faculty. And the use of reason becomes daily more visible, as these materials that give it employment increase. But though the having of general ideas and the use of general words and reason usually grow together, yet I see not how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of some truths, I confess, is very early in the mind but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will observe, we shall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired; it being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earliest to do, which make the most frequent impressions on their senses. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree and others differ, probably as soon as it has any use of memory; as soon as it is able to retain and perceive distinct ideas. But whether it be then or no, this is certain, it does so long before it has the use of words; or comes to that which we commonly call "the use of reason." For a child knows as certainly before it can speak the difference between the ideas of sweet and bitter (i.e. that sweet is not bitter), as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and sugarplums are not the same thing.
16. Assent to supposed innate truths depends on having clear and distinct ideas of what their terms mean, and not on their innateness. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality; and then, upon explaining those words, he presently assents to, or rather perceives the truth of that proposition. But neither does he then readily assent because it is an innate truth, nor was his assent wanting till then because he wanted the use of reason; but the truth of it appears to him as soon as he has settled in his mind the clear and distinct ideas that these names stand for. And then he knows the truth of that proposition upon the same grounds and by the same means, that he knew before that a rod and a cherry are not the same thing; and upon the same grounds also that he may come to know afterwards "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," as shall be more fully shown hereafter. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas about which those maxims are; or to know the signification of those general terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they stand for; the later also will it be before he comes to assent to those maxims;- whose terms, with the ideas they stand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weasel, he must stay till time and observation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the first occasion that shall make him put together those ideas in his mind, and observe whether they agree or disagree, according as is expressed in those propositions. And therefore it is that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-seven, by the same self-evidence that he knows one and two to be equal to three: yet a child knows this not so soon as the other; not for want of the use of reason, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not so soon got, as those which are signified by one, two, and three.
17. Assenting as soon as proposed and understood, proves them not innate. This evasion therefore of general assent when men come to the use of reason, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between those suppose innate and other truths that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to secure an universal assent to those they call maxims, by saying, they are generally assented to as soon as proposed, and the terms they are proposed in understood: seeing all men, even children, as soon as they hear and understand the terms, assent to these propositions, they think it is sufficient to prove them innate. For since men never fail after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propositions were first lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first proposal immediately closes with and assents to, and after that never doubts again.
18. If such an assent be a mark of innate, then "that one and two are equal to three, that sweetness is not bitterness," and a thousand the like, must be innate. In answer to this, I demand whether ready assent given to a proposition, upon first hearing and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle? If it be not, such a general assent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all such propositions to be innate which are generally assented to as soon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the same ground, viz. of assent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pass for innate, they must also admit several propositions about numbers to be innate; and thus, that one and two are equal to three, that two and two are equal to four, and a multitude of other the like propositions in numbers, that everybody assents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, must have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propositions made about several of them; but even natural philosophy, and all the other sciences, afford propositions which are sure to meet with assent as soon as they are understood. That "two bodies cannot be in the same place" is a truth that nobody any more sticks at than at these maxims, that "it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," that "white is not black," that "a square is not a circle," that "bitterness is not sweetness." These and a million of such other propositions, as many at least as we have distinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names stand for, must necessarily assent to. If these men will be true to their own rule, and have assent at first hearing and understanding the terms to be a mark of innate, they must allow not only as many innate propositions as men have distinct ideas, but as many as men can make propositions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every proposition wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find assent at first hearing and understanding the terms as this general one, "It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," or that which is the foundation of it, and is the easier understood of the two, "The same is not different"; by which account they will have legions of innate propositions of this one sort, without mentioning any other. But, since no proposition can be innate unless the ideas about which it is be innate, this will be to suppose all our ideas of colours, sounds, tastes, figure, &c., innate, than which there cannot be anything more opposite to reason and experience. Universal and ready assent upon hearing and understanding the terms is, I grant, a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else, (as we shall show hereafter,) belongs to several propositions which nobody was yet so extravagant as to pretend to be innate.
19. Such less general propositions known before these universal maxims. Nor let it be said, that those more particular self-evident propositions, which are assented to at first hearing, as that "one and two are equal to three," that "green is not red," &c., are received as the consequences of those more universal propositions which are looked on as innate principles; since any one, who will but take the pains to observe what passes in the understanding, will certainly find that these, and the like less general propositions, are certainly known, and firmly assented to by those who are utterly ignorant of those more general maxims; and so, being earlier in the mind than those (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the assent wherewith they are received at first hearing.
20. "One and one equal to Two, &c , not general nor useful," answered. If it be said, that these propositions, viz. "two and two are equal to four," "red is not blue," &c., are not general maxims, nor of any great use, I answer, that makes nothing to the argument of universal assent upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever proposition can be found that receives general assent as soon as heard and understood, that must be admitted for an innate proposition, as well as this maxim, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," they being upon this ground equal. And as to the difference of being more general, that makes this maxim more remote from being innate; those general and abstract ideas being more strangers to our first apprehensions than those of more particular self-evident propositions; and therefore it is longer before they are admitted and assented to by the growing understanding. And as to the usefulness of these magnified maxims, that perhaps will not be found so great as is generally conceived, when it comes in its due place to be more fully considered.
21. These maxims not being known sometimes till proposed, proves them not innate. But we have not yet done with "assenting to propositions at first hearing and understanding their terms." It is fit we first take notice that this, instead of being a mark that they are innate, is a proof of the contrary; since it supposes that several, who understand and know other things, are ignorant of these principles till they are proposed to them; and that one may be unacquainted with these truths till he hears them from others. For, if they were innate, what need they be proposed in order to gaining assent, when, by being in the understanding, by a natural and original impression, (if there were any such,) they could not but be known before? Or doth the proposing them print them clearer in the mind than nature did? If so, then the consequence will be, that a man knows them better after he has been thus taught them than he did before. Whence it will follow that these principles may be made more evident to us by others' teaching than nature has made them by impression: which will ill agree with the opinion of innate principles, and give but little authority to them; but, on the contrary, makes them unfit to be the foundations of all our other knowledge; as they are pretended to be. This cannot be denied, that men grow first acquainted with many of these self-evident truths upon their being proposed: but it is clear that whosoever does so, finds in himself that he then begins to know a proposition, which he knew not before, and which from thenceforth he never questions; not because it was innate, but because the consideration of the nature of the things contained in those words would not suffer him to think otherwise, how, or whensoever he is brought to reflect on them. And if whatever is assented to at first hearing and understanding the terms must pass for an innate principle, every well-grounded observation, drawn from particulars into a general rule, must be innate. When yet it is certain that not all, but only sagacious heads, light at first on these observations, and reduce them into general propositions: not innate, but collected from a preceding acquaintance and reflection on particular instances. These, when observing men have made them, unobserving men, when they are proposed to them, cannot refuse their assent to.
22. Implicitly known before proposing, signifies that the mind is capable of understanding them, or else signifies nothing. If it be said, the understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles, but not an explicit, before this first hearing (as they must who will say "that they are in the understanding before they are known,") it will be hard to conceive what is meant by a principle imprinted on the understanding implicitly, unless it be this,- that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting firmly to such propositions. And thus all mathematical demonstrations, as well as first principles, must be received as native impressions on the mind; which I fear they will scarce allow them to be, who find it harder to demonstrate a proposition than assent to it when demonstrated. And few mathematicians will be forward to believe, that all the diagrams they have drawn were but copies of those innate characters which nature had engraven upon their minds.
23. The argument of assenting on first hearing, is upon a false supposition of no precedent teaching. There is, I fear, this further weakness in the foregoing argument, which would persuade us that therefore those maxims are to be thought innate, which men admit at first hearing; because they assent to propositions which they are not taught, nor do receive from the force of any argument or demonstration, but a bare explication or understanding of the terms. Under which there seems to me to lie this fallacy, that men are supposed not to be taught nor to learn anything de novo; when, in truth, they are taught, and do learn something they were ignorant of before. For, first, it is evident that they have learned the terms, and their signification; neither of which was born with them. But this is not all the acquired knowledge in the case: the ideas themselves, about which the proposition is, are not born with them, no more than their names, but got afterwards. So that in all propositions that are assented to at first hearing, the terms of the proposition, their standing for such ideas, and the ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them innate, I would fain know what there is remaining in such propositions that is innate. For I would gladly have any one name that proposition whose terms or ideas were either of them innate. We by degrees get ideas and names, and learn their appropriated connexion one with another; and then to propositions made in such terms, whose signification we have learnt, and wherein the agreement or disagreement we can perceive in our ideas when put together is expressed, we at first hearing assent; though to other propositions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning ideas not so soon or so easily got, we are at the same time no way capable of assenting. For, though a child quickly assents to this proposition, "That an apple is not fire," when by familiar acquaintance he has got the ideas of those two different things distinctly imprinted on his mind, and has learnt that the names apple and fire stand for them; yet it will be some years after, perhaps, before the same child will assent to this proposition, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be"; because that, though perhaps the words are as easy to be learnt, yet the signification of them being more large, comprehensive, and abstract than of the names annexed to those sensible things the child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his mind those general ideas they stand for. Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any child assent to a proposition made up of such general terms; but as soon as ever he has got those ideas, and learned their names, he forwardly closes with the one as well as the other of the forementioned propositions: and with both for the same reason; viz. because he finds the ideas he has in his mind to agree or disagree, according as the words standing for them are affirmed or denied one of another in the proposition. But if propositions be brought to him in words which stand for ideas he has not yet in his mind, to such propositions, however evidently true or false in themselves, he affords neither assent nor dissent, but is ignorant. For words being but empty sounds, any further than they are signs of our ideas, we cannot but assent to them as they correspond to those ideas we have, but no further than that. But the showing by what steps and ways knowledge comes into our minds; and the grounds of several degrees of assent, being the business of the following Discourse, it may suffice to have only touched on it here, as one reason that made me doubt of those innate principles.
24. Not innate, because not universally assented to. To conclude this argument of universal consent, I agree with these defenders of innate principles,- that if they are innate, they must needs have universal assent. For that a truth should be innate and yet not assented to, is to me as unintelligible as for a man to know a truth and be ignorant of it at the same time. But then, by these men's own confession, they cannot be innate; since they are not assented to by those who understand not the terms; nor by a great part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of those propositions; which, I think, is at least one half of mankind. But were the number far less, it would be enough to destroy universal assent, and thereby show these propositions not to be innate, if children alone were ignorant of them.
25. These maxims not the first known. But that I may not be accused to argue from the thoughts of infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what passes in their understandings before they express it; I say next, that these two general propositions are not the truths that first possess the minds of children, nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious notions: which, if they were innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not, there is certainly a time when children begin to think, and their words and actions do assure us that they do so. When therefore they are capable of thought, of knowledge, of assent, can it rationally be supposed they can be ignorant of those notions that nature has imprinted, were there any such? Can it be imagined, with any appearance of reason, that they perceive the impressions from things without, and be at the same time ignorant of those characters which nature itself has taken care to stamp within? Can they receive and assent to adventitious notions, and be ignorant of those which are supposed woven into the very principles of their being, and imprinted there in indelible characters, to be the foundation and guide of all their acquired knowledge and future reasonings? This would be to make nature take pains to no purpose; or at least to write very ill; since its characters could not be read by those eyes which saw other things very well: and those are very ill supposed the clearest parts of truth, and the foundations of all our knowledge, which are not first known, and without which the undoubted knowledge of several other things may be had. The child certainly knows, that the nurse that feeds it is neither the cat it plays with, nor the blackmoor it is afraid of: that the wormseed or mustard it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for: this it is certainly and undoubtedly assured of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of this principle, "That it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be," that it so firmly assents to these and other parts of its knowledge? Or that the child has any notion or apprehension of that proposition at an age, wherein yet, it is plain, it knows a great many other truths? He that will say, children join in these general abstract speculations with their sucking-bottles and their rattles, may perhaps, with justice, be thought to have more passion and zeal for his opinion, but less sincerity and truth, than one of that age.
26. And so not innate. Though therefore there be several general propositions that meet with constant and ready assent, as soon as proposed to men grown up, who have attained the use of more general and abstract ideas, and names standing for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender years, who nevertheless know other things, they cannot pretend to universal assent of intelligent persons, and so by no means can be supposed innate;- it being impossible that any truth which is innate (if there were any such) should be unknown, at least to any one who knows anything else. Since, if they are innate truths, they must be innate thoughts: there being nothing a truth in the mind that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there by any innate truths, they must necessarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear.
27. Not innate, because they appear least where what is innate shows itself clearest. That the general maxims we are discoursing of are not known to children, idiots, and a great part of mankind, we have already sufficiently proved: whereby it is evident they have not an universal assent, nor are general impressions. But there is this further argument in it against their being innate: that these characters, if they were native and original impressions, should appear fairest and clearest in those persons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them; and it is, in my opinion, a strong presumption that they are not innate, since they are least known to those in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, savages, and illiterate people, being of all others the least corrupted by custom, or borrowed opinions; learning and education having not cast their native thoughts into new moulds; nor by super-inducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded those fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine that in their minds these innate notions should lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals; which being stamped immediately on the soul, (as these men suppose,) can have no dependence on the constitution or organs of the body, the only confessed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these men's principles, that all these native beams of light (were there any such) should, in those who have no reserves, no arts of concealment, shine out in their full lustre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure and abhorrence of pain. But alas, amongst children, idiots, savages, and the grossly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What universal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from those objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their senses the frequentest and strongest impressions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age; and a young savage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe. But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of science, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general propositions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians: much less are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impressions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that sort of conversation or learning, where disputes are frequent; these maxims being suited to artificial argumentation and useful for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth or advancement of knowledge. But of their small use for the improvement of knowledge I shall have occasion to speak more at large, 1. 4, c. 7.
28. Recapitulation. I know not how absurd this may seem to the masters of demonstration. And probably it will hardly go down with anybody at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of censure, till I have been heard out in the sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to submit to better judgments. And since I impartially search after truth, I shall not be sorry to be convinced, that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confess we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed our heads with them.
Upon the whole matter, I cannot see any ground to think these two speculative Maxims innate: since they are not universally assented to; and the assent they so generally find is no other than what several propositions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them: and since the assent that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural inscription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Discourse. And if these "first principles" of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other speculative maxims can (I suppose), with better right pretend to be so.
Libro II. Capítulo 1. De las ideas en general, y de su origen
§ 1.
'Idea' es el objeto del pensamiento. Siendo cada ser humano consciente por sí mismo de que piensa, y siendo aquello a lo que se aplica su mente mientras piensa ideas que están ahí, es incuestionable que los seres humanos tienen en sus mentes varias ideas, tales como las que expresan las palabras "blancura", "dureza", "dulzura", "pensamiento", "movimiento", "ser humano", "elefante", "ejército", "ebriedad", y otras. Lo primero que cabe preguntarse entonces será ¿cómo llega a ellas? Sé que se acepta la idea de que los seres humanos llevan impresas en sus mentes nada más nacer ideas innatas y caracteres propios. Ya he examinado en profundidad esta opinión, y supongo que lo que he dicho en el Libro anterior podrá admitirse con mucha más facilidad cuando haya demostrado de dónde saca el entendimiento todas las ideas que tiene, y de qué maneras y en qué grados le llegan a la mente, para lo que apelaré a la capacidad de observación y a la experiencia de cada ser humano.§ 2.
Todas las ideas vienen de la sensación o de la reflexión. Supongamos entonces que la mente sea, como decimos, un papel en blanco, desprovisto de caracteres, sin ideas: ¿cómo llega a equiparse? ¿Cómo accede a ese almacén inmenso que pinta la imaginación de un ser humano (tan atareada siempre y tan sin límites) y que muestra una variedad casi inagotable? ¿Dónde consigue todos los materiales de la razón y el conocimiento? A esta pregunta contesto con una palabra, de la EXPERIENCIA. En ella se funda todo nuestro conocimiento, y de ella procede nuestro conocimiento en última instancia. Es nuestra observación, ya sea empleada en los objetos sensibles externos o bien en las operaciones internas percibidas y meditadas por nosotros, la que proporciona a nuestro entendimiento todos los materiales que empleamos al pensar. He aquí las dos fuentes del conocimiento, de donde brotan todas las ideas que tenemos, o que podemos llegar a tener, de manera natural.§ 3.
Los objetos de la sensación, una de las fuentes de las ideas. En primer lugar, nuestros sentidos, al entrar en contacto con objetos sensibles particulares, generan en la mente varias percepciones distintas de las cosas, que varían según los diferentes modos en que esos objetos las afectan. Así llegamos a las ideas que tenemos de amarillo, blanco, calor, frío, blando, duro, amargo, dulce, y a todas las que llamamos cualidades sensibles, y cuando digo que los sentidos las generan en la mente, quiero decir que éstos, a partir de objetos externos, generan en la mente lo que producen en ella dichas percepciones. A esta gran fuente de casi todas las ideas que tenemos, que depende completamente de los sentidos, y que deriva de éstos al entendimiento, la llamo SENSACIÓN.§ 4.
Las operaciones de nuestra mente, la otra fuente de las ideas. En segundo lugar, la otra fuente empleada por la experiencia para equipar el entendimiento con ideas es la percepción en nuestro propio interior de las operaciones de nuestra mente cuando ésta se ocupa de las ideas que contiene; operaciones que, cuando el alma las medita y considera, equipan el entendimiento con otro conjunto de ideas que no podrían obtenerse directamente de las cosas. Tales operaciones son la percepción, el pensamiento, la duda, la creencia, el razonamiento, el conocimiento, la volición, y todas las diferentes actuaciones de nuestras mentes; siendo consciente de éstas, y observándolas en nuestro interior, las recibimos en nuestro entendimiento como ideas distintas, como recibimos los cuerpos que afectan nuestros sentidos. Esta fuente de ideas está en el interior de cada ser humano; y aunque no es sensación, pues nada tiene que ver con los objetos externos, aun así se le parece, por lo que podríamos llamarla sensación interna. Pero como a lo otro lo llamo SENSACIÓN, llamaré a esto REFLEXIÓN, siendo las ideas que ésta se permite tener sólo las que la mente logra mediante la reflexión sobre sus propias operaciones internas. De aquí en adelante, se entenderá que "reflexión" es, por tanto, ese darse cuenta de sus propias operaciones que realiza la mente con la razón, y las maneras en que las realiza, razón por la que llega a haber ideas de estas operaciones en el entendimiento. Estas dos, a saber, las cosas materiales externas, en tanto que objetos de la SENSACIÓN, y las operaciones internas de nuestras propias mentes, en tanto que objetos de la REFLEXIÓN, son para mí las únicas fuentes de todas nuestras ideas. Uso aquí el término 'operaciones' en un sentido amplio, que incluye no sólo las actuaciones de la mente respecto a sus ideas, sino también lo que podrían llamarse las pasiones que surgen a veces de ellas, como la satisfacción o el malestar que surge de cualquier pensamiento.§ 5.
Todas nuestras ideas son de una de estas dos fuentes. En el entendimiento no hay rastro, pienso, de ninguna idea que éste no haya recibido de una de esas dos fuentes. Los objetos externos equipan la mente con ideas de las cualidades sensibles, que son todas esas percepciones distintas que producen en nosotros; y la mente equipa el entendimiento con ideas sobre sus propias operaciones. Si examinamos éstas a conciencia, junto con sus varios modos, combinaciones y relaciones, veremos que contienen el total de nuestras ideas; y que no tenemos nada en nuestras mentes que no nos haya llegado de una de estas dos formas. Que examine cualquiera sus propios pensamientos, e investigue a fondo su entendimiento, y diga si no es cierto que todas las ideas originales que se tienen proceden de los objetos de los sentidos o de las operaciones de la propia mente en tanto que objetos de su reflexión. Y al margen del volumen de conocimiento que pueda haber alojado allí, una inspección rigurosa mostrará que no hay una sola idea en su mente que no haya sido impresa por una de estas dos fuentes, aunque, el entendimiento pueda haberlas agrandado y enriquecido con una variedad infinita, como veremos a continuación.§ 6.
Observable en las niñas y los niños. Si contemplamos atentamente el estado de un bebé recién venido al mundo tenemos pocos motivos para creer que éste tenga almacenadas muchas ideas que serán el material de su futuro conocimiento. La cabeza se le irá equipando gradualmente. Y aunque las ideas de cualidades evidentes y familiares se graban antes de que la memoria empiece a registrar el tiempo o el orden, las cualidades inusuales aparecen a menudo tan tarde que pocos seres humanos son incapaces de recordar el principio de su contacto con ellas. Si mereciera la pena, se podría intentar que un niño sólo hiciera uso de unas pocas ideas ordinarias hasta que se convirtiera en un hombre. Sin embargo, todos los seres humanos están rodeados por cuerpos que les afectan constantemente y de diferentes maneras, y en las mentes de las niñas y los niños se graban muchas y variadas ideas, al margen de lo mucho o poco que les cuidemos. Si tenemos los ojos abiertos, habrá luz y color donde quiera que miremos; los sonidos y algunas cualidades tangibles no fallan a la hora de llamar la atención de nuestros sentidos, forzando su entrada en la mente. No obstante, si un niño se hiciera hombre en un lugar donde sólo pudiera ver en blanco y negro, entiendo que se puede conceder con facilidad que no tendría más noción de lo que es rojo o verde que la de otro sobre el sabor de una ostra o una piña cuando nunca ha probado estos manjares.§ 7.
Los seres humanos se equipan con diferentes ideas dependiendo de los diferentes objetos con los que entran en contacto. Así pues, los seres humanos se van equipando con un número variable de ideas simples del exterior, en función de los diferentes objetos con los que entren en contacto; así como con las operaciones que sus mentes hacen en su interior, que variarán en función de cuánto reflexionen sobre éstos. Y es que aunque quien contempla las operaciones de su mente no puede evitar tener ideas claras y sencillas de ellas, como no decida pensar en eso, prestarles atención, no podrá tener ideas claras y distintas sobre las operaciones de su mente, ni sobre todo lo que pueda observarse a partir de ellas; de igual manera que no se pueden tener ideas particulares sobre un paisaje o las partes y los movimientos de un reloj si antes no se los contempla y se examinan sus partes. El cuadro o el reloj podrán estar allí donde puedan ser vistos pero si quien puede contemplarlos no les presta atención, y los analiza, no podrá tener más que una idea confusa de las partes que los constituyen.§ 8.
Las ideas de la reflexión vienen después, pues requieren nuestra atención. Así se explica que la mayoría de los seres humanos sólo consigan tener ideas de las operaciones de sus propias mentes pasada la niñez (aunque muchos no consiguen tener en toda su vida una idea clara o perfecta de la mayor parte de lo que piensan); porque, aunque están ahí todo ese tiempo, como visiones flotantes, la impresión que dejan no es lo bastante profunda como para producir en sus mentes ideas claras, distintas, duraderas, a las que el entendimiento pueda atender, sobre cuyas operaciones pueda reflexionar, que pueda convertir en objetos de su contemplación. En nuestra infancia, nos vemos rodeados por un mundo de cosas nuevas que, al reclamar continuamente la atención de nuestros sentidos, atraen a la mente constantemente hacia ellas, a que nos demos cuenta de ellas, y a que disfrutemos con tal variedad de objetos cambiantes. Así, solemos emplear nuestros primeros años en mirar afuera; nuestro asunto es familiarizarnos con lo que está afuera, y al tener que crecer prestando una atención constante a las sensaciones halladas afuera, rara vez podemos reflexionar sobre lo que pasa dentro de nuestro interior, al menos hasta llegar a una edad más madura (aunque haya quien nunca lo consiga).§ 9.
El alma empieza a tener ideas cuando empieza a percibir. Preguntar cuándo empieza un ser humano a tener ideas es preguntar cuándo empieza a percibir, pues tener ideas y percibir son una misma cosa. Sé que existe la opinión de que el alma siempre piensa, y de que contiene la percepción de las ideas desde siempre y mientras exista; y de que pensar es tan inseparable del alma como la extensión lo es del cuerpo, lo que si fuera cierto implicaría que investigar sobre el origen de las ideas de un ser humano sería lo mismo que investigar sobre el origen de su alma; pues, según esta perspectiva, el alma y sus ideas, como el cuerpo y su extensión, empiezan a existir al mismo tiempo.§ 10.
El alma no piensa siempre; bien, esto hay que demostrarlo. Si el alma existe antes de, al tiempo que, o algún tiempo después de los primeros rudimentos de la organización, o los inicios de la vida en el cuerpo, es una discusión que dejo a quienes hayan reflexionado más sobre esa cuestión. Yo confieso tener una de esas almas normales, que no se percibe a sí misma contemplando ideas siempre; ni puede concebir como más necesario para el alma estar siempre pensando que para el cuerpo estar siempre en movimiento, pues (según lo entiendo yo) la percepción de las ideas es al alma lo que el movimiento es al cuerpo: no su esencia sino una de sus operaciones. Y por lo tanto, aunque supongamos que pensar es una acción propia del alma, no es necesario suponer que ésta tenga que estar siempre pensando, siempre activa. Quizá ése sea un privilegio reservado al Autor infinito, al Conservador de todas las cosas, que "nunca cesa de atender y nunca duerme", pero no es posible con los seres finitos, con la mente humana. Sabemos por experiencia que a veces pensamos; y así es cómo podemos concluir sin miedo al error que en nosotros existe algo que tiene el poder de pensar. Sin embargo, por los datos que nos ofrece la experiencia, no podemos saber si esa sustancia piensa de forma continua o no. Decir entonces que pensar es esencial al alma, e inseparable de ella, es evitar lo que se está cuestionando, no es probarlo con la razón; y necesitamos probarlo a menos que sea una proposición evidente en sí misma. Pero si esto, "Que el alma siempre está pensando", es una proposición evidente en sí misma, que todo el mundo acepta al oírla por primera vez, permitidme decir algo. Yo no sé si pensé anoche o no. Como la cuestión es relativa a un hecho, se comienza por aportar como prueba del mismo una hipótesis, que es precisamente lo que se tiene que probar: por qué medio alguien puede probar algo, y resulta que es suponiendo que todos los relojes, mientras funcionen, piensan, y que por tanto queda suficientemente probado, más allá de toda duda, que mi reloj pensó anoche, toda la noche. Sin embargo, quien no quiera engañarse, tendrá que construir su hipótesis con hechos, a partir de la experiencia sensible, en lugar de presuponer los hechos partiendo de que su hipótesis es correcta: ¿qué es lo que prueba que yo necesariamente estuve pensando anoche, toda la noche?, ¿que otro presupone que yo estoy pensando siempre, aunque yo mismo no puedo percibir que esté haciéndolo siempre? Sin embargo, los seres humanos que aman sus opiniones no sólo presuponen lo que está en cuestión, sino que además alegan hechos erróneos. ¿Cómo, si no, podría alguien atribuirme la inferencia de que algo no es porque no lo percibimos cuando dormimos? Yo no digo que los seres humanos no tengan alma porque no la perciban mientras duermen, pero sí digo que no pueden pensar, estén despiertos o dormidos, sin percibir que están pensando. Que seamos sensibles a esto sólo le es necesario a nuestros propios pensamientos, pero para ellos lo es, y siempre lo será, hasta que podamos pensar sin ser conscientes de ello.§ 11.
No siempre es consciente de ello. Concedo que el alma, en un hombre que esté despierto, no está nunca sin pensamiento, pues es ésta la condición de la vigilia. Pero si dormir sin soñar no es una afección del hombre completo, tanto la mente como el cuerpo merecería ser considerada por el hombre despierto, siendo difícil concebir que pudiera pensar algo y no ser consciente de ello. Si el alma pensara en un hombre dormido que no es consciente de ello, pregunto si, durante tal pensar, éste siente dolor o placer, o si es capaz de felicidad o tristeza. Estoy seguro de que no, no más que la cama o la tierra sobre las que reposa, pues ser feliz o estar triste sin ser consciente de ello me parece literalmente incoherente e imposible. O si fuera posible que el alma puede, mientras el cuerpo duerme, disponer de su pensar, de lo que la hace disfrutar, de sus preocupaciones, de sus placeres o penas, aparte, sin que ese hombre sea consciente de ello y sin que en ello participe, entonces sería cierto que Sócrates dormido y Sócrates despierto no podría ser la misma persona, sino su alma cuando duerme y Sócrates el hombre, compuesto de cuerpo y alma, cuando estuviera despierto, por lo que sería dos personas, puesto que el Sócrates que está despierto no tiene más conocimiento de, o preocupación por esa felicidad o tristeza de su alma –que disfruta sola cuando él duerme, sin percibirla–, que por la felicidad o la tristeza de un hombre de las Indias a quien no conoce. Y es que si eliminamos toda consciencia de nuestras acciones y sensaciones, especialmente del placer y el dolor y los asuntos que los acompañan, será difícil saber dónde ubicar la identidad personal.Libro II, Capítulo 12. De las ideas complejas
§ 1.
Construidas por la mente de ideas simples. Hasta aquí hemos considerado aquellas ideas en cuya recepción la mente sólo permanece pasiva: son las ideas simples, que recibimos de la sensación y la reflexión como mencionamos anteriormente, de donde la mente no puede crear ni una por sí misma, ni tampoco tener ninguna que no esté formada totalmente por ellas. No obstante, aunque la mente reciba de manera totalmente pasiva todas sus ideas simples, ejerce varios actos por sí misma, mediante los cuales, a partir de estas ideas simples, y tomándolas como materiales y fundamentos del resto, se forman las otras. Los actos de la mente, por los que ésta ejerce su poder sobre las ideas simples, son principalmente estos tres:
1. Combinar varias ideas simples en una compuesta; así se forman todas ideas complejas.
2. El segundo es juntar dos ideas, ya sean simples o complejas, poniéndola una junto a la otra, para poder verlas al tiempo sin haberlas fundido en una; así logra todas sus ideas de relaciones.
3. El tercero es separarlas de todas las otras ideas que las acompañan en su existencia real, a lo que se le llama abstracción; así es cómo se construyen las ideas generales.
Esto demuestra que el poder del ser humano y sus formas de operar son básicamente las mismas en el mundo material y en el intelectual: no teniendo los seres humanos el poder de crear o destruir los materiales de ambos mundos, todo lo que pueden hacer es unirlos, ponerlos unos junto a otros o bien separarlos totalmente.
Empezaré aquí considerando el primer caso relativo a las ideas complejas, y trataré los otros dos en su momento. Al igual que se observa que las ideas simples pueden existir unidas en diferentes combinaciones, la mente tiene el poder de considerar varias de éstas unidas en una idea, y no sólo tal y como aparecen unidas en objetos externos, sino también tal y como la mente las una. A las ideas que así se componen de varias ideas simples que han sido juntadas las llamo complejas; tal es el caso de la belleza, la gratitud, un ser humano, un ejército, el universo, éstas, aunque formadas por varias ideas simples, o siendo ideas complejas formadas por las simples, pueden ser, cuando le plazca a la mente, consideradas cada una en sí mismas como un algo completo, y significadas con un nombre.
§ 2.
Construidas voluntariamente. Por esta facultad de repetir y unir ideas, la mente tiene gran poder para variar y multiplicar los objetos de sus pensamientos, infinitamente más allá de lo que recibió de la sensación o la reflexión; aunque todo aún confinado a esas ideas simples que recibió de esas dos fuentes, y que son los materiales últimos de todas sus composiciones. Pues las ideas simples proceden todas de las propias cosas, y de éstas la mente no puede tener más ni otras que no sean las que le son sugeridas. No puede tener ninguna otra idea de las cualidades sensibles que las que le vengan del exterior a través de los sentidos; ni ninguna idea de otro tipo de operaciones de una sustancia pensante que las que encuentre en sí misma. No obstante, cuando dispone ya de estas ideas, la mente no queda confinada a la mera observación, y a lo que recibe del exterior, puede, por su propio poder, juntar esas ideas que tiene para construir nuevas ideas complejas que nunca recibió en ese estado de unión.
§ 3.
Las ideas complejas son ideas de modos, de sustancias o de relaciones. Las IDEAS COMPLEJAS, al margen de cómo se compongan y descompongan, aunque su número sea finito y su variedad infinita y llenen y entretengan los pensamientos de los seres humanos, pueden ser todas, pienso, agrupadas bajo estos tres encabezamientos:
1) MODOS.
2) SUSTANCIAS.
3) RELACIONES.
§ 4.
Ideas de los modos. En primer lugar, llamo "modos" a las ideas complejas que, al margen de cómo estén compuestas, no contienen en sí mismas la suposición de subsistir por sí mismas, sino que son consideradas como dependientes de o afecciones de las sustancias. Tal es el caso de ideas significadas por las palabras triángulo, gratitud, asesinato, y demás. Y si en esto empleo la palabra "modo" en un sentido algo distinto al normal, me disculpo: es inevitable que los discursos que difieren de las nociones recibidas ordinariamente o bien inventen palabras o bien empleen las existentes con una suerte de nuevo significado; la última, para nuestro caso, es la opción más tolerable.
§ 5.
Los modos simple y mixto de las ideas simples. De estos modos, existen dos tipos que merecen una consideración distinta:
-En primer lugar, existen unos que son sólo variaciones o combinaciones diferentes de la misma idea simple, sin la mezcla de ninguna otra, como 'docena' o 'veintena', que no son más que las ideas de tantas unidades distintas sumadas las unas a las otras. A éstos los llamo "modos simples" pues están contenidos dentro de los límites de una idea simple.
-En segundo lugar, existen otros compuestos de ideas simples de varios tipos, juntadas para hacer una idea compleja, como 'belleza', que consiste en cierta composición de color y figura que causa deleite a quien la contempla, 'robo', que es el cambio secreto de la posesión de algo producido sin el consentimiento de su propietario, y que contienen, como se ve, una combinación de varias ideas de varios tipos. A éstos los llamo "modos mixtos".
§ 6.
Las ideas de sustancias, simples o colectivas. En segundo lugar, las ideas de sustancias son las combinaciones de ideas simples que se entiende que representan cosas particulares distintas que subsisten por sí mismas; la supuesta y confusa idea de sustancia, tal y como es, es siempre la primera y principal. Así, si a la sustancia se le añade la idea simple de un cierto color blanquecino, con ciertos grados de peso, dureza, ductilidad y fusibilidad, tenemos la idea de plomo; y si a la sustancia se le añade una combinación de las ideas de un cierto tipo de figura, con la capacidad de movimiento, pensamiento y razonamiento, tenemos la idea ordinaria de un ser humano. Sobre las sustancias existen también dos tipos de ideas: una de sustancias simples, que existen separadamente, como 'hombre' o 'cordero'; la otra de varias de ésas juntas, como 'ejército de hombres', o 'rebaño de ovejas'; las ideas colectivas de varias sustancias así reunidas son cada una una idea simple, tanto como la de un hombre o una unidad.
§ 7.
Las ideas de relación. En tercer lugar, el ultimo tipo de ideas complejas es el que llamamos de relación, que consiste en la consideración y en la comparación de una idea con otra. Trataremos estos varios tipos en su momento.
§ 8.
Las ideas más abstrusas que podemos tener proceden todas de dos fuentes. Rastrear el progreso de nuestra mente observando con atención cómo ésta repite, suma y une sus ideas simples recibidas de la sensación o la reflexión nos puede llevar más lejos de lo que cabría imaginar en un principio. Y, si observamos cuidadosamente los originales de nuestras nociones, encontraremos, pienso, que incluso las ideas más abstrusas, por alejadas que nos parezcan de los sentidos o de cualquiera de las operaciones de nuestra mente, son con todo tan sólo lo que el entendimiento forma en sí mismo mediante la repetición y la unión de ideas que tenía procedentes de los objetos de los sentidos o bien de sus propias operaciones sobre éstos; por lo que incluso esas ideas grandes y abstractas derivan de la sensación o de la reflexión, y no son otra cosa que lo que la mente, a través del uso ordinario de sus propias facultades, ocupada en las ideas recibidas de objetos de los sentidos o desde las operaciones que observa en sí misma sobre éstos, puede y consigue alcanzar.
Segundo tratado sobre el gobierno (1690)
CAPITULO II. DEL ESTADO NATURAL
§ 4.
Para comprender bien en qué consiste el poder político y para remontarnos a su verdadera fuente, será forzoso que consideremos cuál es el estado en que se encuentran naturalmente los hombres, a saber: un estado de completa libertad para ordenar sus actos y para disponer de sus propiedades y de sus personas como mejor les parezca, dentro de los limites de la ley natural sin necesidad de pedir permiso y sin depender de la voluntad de otra persona.Es también un estado de igualdad, dentro del cual todo poder y toda jurisdicción son recíprocos, en el que nadie tiene más que otro, puesto que no hay cosa más evidente que el que seres de la misma especie y de idéntico rango, nacidos para participar sin distinción de todas las ventajas de la Naturaleza y para servirse de las mismas facultades, sean también iguales entre ellos, sin subordinación ni sometimiento, a menos que el Señor y Dueño de todos ellos haya colocado, por medio de una clara manifestación de su voluntad, a uno de ellos por encima de los demás, y que le haya conferido, mediante un nombramiento evidente y claro, el derecho indiscutible al poder y a la soberanía.
§ 5.
El juicioso Hooker considera tan evidente por sí misma y tan fuera de toda discusión esta igualdad natural de los hombres, que la toma como base de la obligatoriedad del amor mutuo entre los hombres y sobre ella levanta el edificio de los deberes mutuos que tienen, y de ella deduce las grandes máximas de la justicia y de la caridad. He aquí cómo se expresa:
"Esa misma inclinación natural ha llevado a los hombres a reconocer que tan obligados como a sí mismos están a amar a los demás, porque si en todas esas cosas son iguales, deben regirse por una misma medida; si yo necesariamente tengo que desear recibir de los demás todo el bien que un hombre puede desear en su propia alma, ¿cómo voy a poder aspirar a ver satisfecho mi deseo si yo mismo no me cuido de satisfacer ese mismo deseo que sienten indiscutiblemente los demás hombres, que, por ser de idéntica naturaleza, tienen que sentirse tan dolidos como yo de que se les ofrezca algo que repugne a este deseo? De modo que, si yo causo un daño, he de esperar sufrimientos, porque no hay razón que obligue a los demás a tratarme a mí con mayor amor que el que yo les he demostrado a ellos. De modo, pues, que mi deseo de ser amado, por mis iguales naturales en todo lo que es posible, me impone el deber natural de consagrarles a ellos plenamente el mismo afecto. Y nadie ignora las diferentes reglas y leyes que, partiendo de esa igualdad entre nosotros y los que son como nosotros mismos, ha dictado la ley natural para dirigir la vida del hombre" (Eccl. Pol., lib. I).
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